Cheap Jacks’ Culture: A Summary and Reflection on Raymond Williams’ Chapter “Culture is Ordinary”.
Working-class English littérateur Raymond Williams, educated at Oxford University, challenged dominant paradigm definitions of culture (Williams, 1983). In the same year his father passed away, Williams’ book Culture and Society 1780–1950 was born (McGuigan, 2014a). In it, he gives a statement that shaped his legacy, and he titled his book’s first chapter “Culture is ordinary” (McGuigan, 2014b). In an autobiographical essay style, Williams paints a picture of a modest community, an ordinary working-class journey he and others take daily (McGuigan, 2014b,p. 2). He asserts his view on culture as ordinary while demonstrating that the making of society takes place through “finding of common meanings and directions” (McGuigan, 2014b, p. 2) in debate and democratic dialogue. Therefore culture has two phases, in the view of Williams, first; “known meanings and directions and second; new observations and meanings” (McGuigan, 2014b). He explains that the making of the human mind happens by slowly learning meanings and testing new meanings; he then continues to say that this is the ordinary process of human society and the human mind and we see through them the nature of culture” (McGuigan, 2014b).
Williams characterises two colours of culture as present in British society. A Teashop colour: “The outward and emphatically visible sign of a special kind of … cultivated people”(McGuigan, 2014b). And a Drinking-Hole colour or “CheapJacks: People who ignore culture’s ethical content in favour of a purely technical standard and who use “scraps of linguistics, psychology and sociology to influence what he thinks of as the mass mind” (McGuigan, 2014b). These two cultures seem to go against each other, and he criticizes both, refusing to learn them as he articulates clearly.
During his studies at Oxford University, Marxist and Leavis teachings significantly impacted his thoughts. Williams presented three main arguments within Marxist beliefs on culture, in which he agrees with only one of them. First, Marxist theorists asserted that culture is interpreted in terms of the production system they exist within; this argument appears to concur with his thoughts, in which he mentions: “a culture is a whole way of life, and the arts are part of a social organization which economic change radically affects” (McGuigan, 2014b). Second, the masses are considered “ignorant”, and third, for socialism to thrive, one must write, learn, and think in a specific “prescribed manner” (McGuigan, 2014b).
As for Leavis, Williams argues that he is more knowledgeable about the “real relations between art and experience” than Marxists” (McGuigan, 2014b). Williams, on the other hand, objects to Leavis’ distinction between pre-and post-industrial-revolution cultures. According to Leavis, vulgar culture takes over old culture and creates a dichotomy between old and new (McGuigan, 2014b). While Leavis’ point of view has gained popularity, it has been met with criticism from Williams. He disagrees with its premises when applied to his own experiences and observations (McGuigan, 2014b). Williams claims that new culture, i.e. industrialised culture, brought with it power. It is inconceivable that he or his community would relinquish this power anytime soon because it was in service of their lives (McGuigan, 2014b). However, Williams does not deny the effect of cheapening culture and multiplying cheapjacks, but he does not think the cause is attributed to cheapening of power. Instead, society’s understanding of culture can make it if we overcome a false proposition, equations and analogy (McGuigan, 2014b).
A false proposition: New powers brought ugliness. It appears that Williams has another narrative against such a proposition. He believes that with new powers, we would have the opportunity and tools to overcome that ugliness and “make England clean and pleasant again” (McGuigan, 2014b p. 6). The real source of such ugliness would not be the powers but the “stupidity, indifference and incoordination” within a society (McGuigan, 2014b, p. 6).
First false equation: Allowing the masses in through popular education results in a commercial culture. Here Williams presents one of his famous quotes in refutation for such an equation: “There are in fact no masses, but only ways of seeing people as masses” (McGuigan, 2014b, p. 6). He puts forward evidence that it is attributed to “social chaos of industrialism” and not to the “masses” becoming literate” (McGuigan, 2014b).
Second false equation: Popular culture reflects the consumers’ standard of living, feelings, and minds. This he rejects based on his experiences of those communities that do not reflect the other. Then he later elaborates how his life experience has given him “natural fitness of feeling”, which has stopped him from labelling or discriminating against others he interacted with. Because his personal life is considerably more ordinary and rich in experiences (McGuigan, 2014b), he suggests that “people whose quality of personal living is high are satisfied by a low quality of printed feeling and opinion. Many of them still live, it is true, in a surprisingly enclosed personal world, much more so than mine, and some of their observations are the finer for it” (McGuigan, 2014b,p. 7).
Finally, a false analogy: “a ‘kind of Gresham’s Law, just as bad money will drive out good, so bad culture will drive out good” (McGuigan, 2014b,p. 7). Williams explains that the increase of “good” culture remains present and increasing even with the “bad” culture.
At the end of this first chapter, Williams proposes three wishes: 1) We should recognise that education is ordinary.2) We should increase art and adult education. 3) Mass culture institutions such as the press should not depend entirely on capitalist means (McGuigan, 2014b).
Analysis:
When the world experienced the industrial revolution and capitalist powers, the trauma of Two World Wars, and especially questions about the role of journalism related to the Holocaust, many were prompted to embark on a journey to find answers on media’s hegemonic effect on people behaviour (Katz, 2003; Seymour, 2000). The passive, ignorant audience, the so-called masses, and all-powerful media in an economic and political structure within Frankfurt School scholars’ thoughts contrasted with Williams’ views because, in essence, they believed the masses were simply ignorant and under mechanical production without any power. Hence the media within the social structure of power was considered a tool in the hands of a ruling class to utilise against the “masses”, the working class (Baran et al., 2012; Katz, 2003). And through popular culture, the working class were lured away from important topics (Baran et al., 2012). Models which trod such views, as the Magic Bullet or Hypodermic needle model were popular (Baran et al., 2012). As for Williams, he gave more voice and active role to the ordinary people by refuting the concept of masses and asserting: “…We should accept, frankly, that if we extend our culture we shall change it: some that are offered will be rejected, other parts will be radically criticized. And this is as it should be, for our arts, now, are in no condition to go down to eternity unchallenged…” (McGuigan, 2014b,p. 9).
In the period of 1940s and 1950s, Lazarsfeld and Merton asserted that media has limited effects on their audiences as opposed to the all powerful media world view (Baran et al., 2012; Katz, 2003). Moreover, the media messages act as reinforcements instead of what is already there in the audience’s mind (Baran et al., 2012; Katz, 2003). Instead of pondering the question of what the media does to their audiences, it was about what audiences do with the media. When comparing Lazarsfeld and Merton, two Columbia scholars, with Raymond Williams and his British culture school, the focus on meaning in British school outweighs the focus on messages (Baran et al., 2012; Katz, 2003). The audience, in Williams’ view, is active when a specific meaning is communicated through the media. Audiences interact with it and negotiate it (Baran et al., 2012; Katz, 2003). In contrast to Columbia’s stimulus-effect approach in a quantified methodological manner, the British culture studies approach to knowledge took anthropological methods compared to Lazarfield’s positivistic and psychological one (Baran et al., 2012; Katz, 2003).
From a technological standpoint, Williams appears to embrace technological development in his commentary on Leavis as a means of power to service people’s lives (McGuigan, 2014b). He expresses appreciation for how technology has aided society and indicates that it will not go away anytime soon (McGuigan, 2014b). Although he embraced it, his viewpoint does not address its impact on communication as the Canadian scholars Mcluhan and Innes do (Baran et al., 2012; Katz, 2003). They have put a strong emphasis on how form has a stronger impact on audiences than content (Baran et al., 2012; Katz, 2003). Under the Canadian scholar’s world view audiences appear to receive “messages” passively unlike Williams “meanings”. However, Williams’ view may not have looked at technology per se as a means of communication but rather encapsulated his understanding of culture in the social processes in which these meanings or newly discovered meanings were manifested (McGuigan, 2014b).
Reflections:
The span in which the scholars of Frankfurt, Columbia, Canadian, and British schools existed may appear from the reading as if they are distant from each other. On the contrary they almost co-existed to a great extent at the same time. While in the 1950’s the work of Lazarsfeld’s applied social group gained popularity as administrative research; in 1958, Williams wrote his essay on culture is ordinary (Baran et al., 2012; Katz, 2003). The development in thought also resembles the world settling down after two world wars and a leap in technological competences in which agriculture and small cities were flourishing into new larger industrial cities (Baran et al., 2012) More individualistic lifestyles, led by capitalism’s economic view, replaced the collectivist one (Williams, 1983). Few researchers who were sceptical and scared by a strong hegemony of power took a pessimistic stance on capitalism while others saw hope and progress in those new technologies (Williams, 1983).
While reading Williams, I reflected on his use of rhetorical devices and analogical style with terms and metaphors. It is ironic that rhetorical theory of communication emphasizes more on the “message” sender role as means to exert more persuasive power on the audience (Johannesen, 1974). Williams kept repeating the term “culture is ordinary” on almost every page if not every other paragraph, where instances of repetition’s rhetorical device takes place. It is almost as if he wanted to use rhetorics as methods of persuasion, which to some extent resort to the Aristotelian persuasion as compared to Plato’s dialectic. Though, while Williams championed meaning-making and audience role, I would argue that he still believed in the effect and role of a medium and media sender in creating an impact on audiences. Instead of relying only on dialectic and reason, his writing style involves emotional stories (e.g. Pathos), references to his own experience as one of these cultures (e.g. Ethos). Such as references to his father and meta-reflections, and additionally, a move from third person to second person in instances such as “man must rhyme” (McGuigan, 2014b,p. 3). Although his article does not discuss the medium he appears to use the medium strongly in building up his message. I would argue that his usage may have played in the hands of the Canadian school views.
Additionally, in the chapter Williams relies on analogies and uses terms from natural sciences such as “equation”, “propositions” and “human mind” almost as if he wanted to speak to a certain audience with a specific domain or reflect his natural science tendences of a new industrialised world.
In various passages of the text he bestows a hopeful view and optimism. In his discussion of power structures and the bourgeoisie, both Marxist points, he refers to working classes as the following: “…To say that most working people are excluded from these is self-evident, though the doors, under sustained pressure, are slowly opening” (McGuigan, 2014b,p. 4). I would suggest that his beliefs in technology, progress, hopefulness and modernist views and its power to help human lives is overestimated. I would leap and propose that he was, in fact, a romantic capitalist modernist. Furthermore, one of the remarks that left me with a big question was his characterisation and defence of the bourgeoisie class and its interaction with power: “The bourgeoisie has given us much, including a narrow but real system of morality; that is at least better than its court predecessors” (McGuigan, 2014b,p. 4). Here, the term “real system of morality” simply raises more questions than answers, i.e. what is a fake system of morality?
Moreover, Williams’ optimism shines through in his criticism of Leavis’ argument. He asserts that, while technology and progress have costs, he believes that the same technological power that empowered agricultural communities could save us if we didn’t make a mistake due to our stupidity. Arguably in a society where capitalist motives run the media and communication landscape, the class promoting such ideas are the “CheapJacks”.
He asserts that culture would have multiple meanings and he wishes for such a society to understand and accept that whatever culture communicated, it is subjected to negotiation and change. Yet his view on a democratic society is that its social agents would reach a “consensus” on meanings; otherwise, that would not be democratic. I interpret this dialectical thought to mean that, even if he believes in various cultures and meanings, as he proposes the way to achieve democratic stability would be in “a consensus of meanings”. In this light, I would assume there are no “multiple” meanings but rather “variations” of the dominant meaning. Hence consensus, in this case, acts as a “tyranny of the collective”. And suppose his final wish was not to let mass culture institutions depend on capitalism entirely. In that case, the power with which cheapjacks or teashop meanings are communicated will dictate the purpose.
It is important to remember that Williams’ writings were published during a transition from agriculture to industry, imperialism to democracy, and, ostensibly, collective to individualism, war to peace. I find it hard to understand if he considered how this view on meaning would hold in a society where such a transition state reached equilibrium. I.e. What is the meaning of small village collectives in a normalised individualistic society in Britain now? E.g. Brexit. And how much meanings deteriorate the further away they exist away from its discovery?
References
Williams, R. (1983). Culture and Society 1780–1950. Columbia University Press.
